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September 2, 2009 [feather]
Professionalism and viewpoint discrimination

Brooklyn College history professor KC Johnson got acquainted with viewpoint discrimination the old-fashioned way: when he was up for tenure, he lived it. And--unlike many academics who find themselves on the wrong side of the ambient groupthink--he was able to document it, and his career survived. He has since become an outspoken advocate of academic freedom (the real kind, the kind that includes being a responsible, ethical professional, and that also includes an awareness that the most vibrant campus environment is one where a wide range of viewpoints and beliefs can be aired, explored, debated, and contested). And, insofar as he's an eloquent advocate of real academic freedom, KC's a bit of a thorn in the side for those who use the concept as a Trojan horse for a decidedly illiberal and intolerant agenda. (There I go with the mixed metaphors again; they happen to me before the caffeine settles in. Just enjoy the image of a wooden horse wounded by an exceptionally sharp thorn ... or of the horse's handlers staggering Christlike in collective thorny injury ... or both.)

Back to KC as thorn. AAUP president and University of Illinois English professor Cary Nelson is finding out about that, having lately framed some highly creative--and disturbing--concepts of when and where it is acceptable for academics to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Here's what KC has to say:


In two recent, high-profile controversies, the self-described "tenured radical" has seemed intent on transforming the AAUP from an organization devoted to promoting academic freedom into a battering ram to perpetuate the groupthink that dominates so many quarters of the contemporary academy.

The first episode occurred in July, after NYU extended a visiting professorship in human rights law to Thio Li-ann, a professor at the National University of Singapore. The appointment generated understandable controversy after revelations that Li-ann, while a member of the Singapore parliament (a body not known for its commitment to human rights in any event), had wanted to continue criminalizing gay sex acts, on the grounds that "diversity is not license for perversity." Li-ann eventually decided not to come to NYU, using as an excuse the poor enrollment of her courses.

As the controversy brewed, Inside Higher Ed's Scott Jaschik drew from Nelson a highly unusual conception of academic freedom:


Nelson also said that in a tenure decision, he would judge a candidate---however offensive his or her views on unrelated subjects---only on a question of whether the person's scholarship and teaching in his or her discipline met appropriate standards. But in a hiring decision (whether for a visiting or permanent position), he said, it is appropriate to consider other factors, and . . . professors can appropriately ask prior to appointments, [Nelson] said, whether hiring someone whose views on certain subjects are "poisonous" could limit "the department's ability to do its business."

In other words, for the president of the AAUP, academic freedom is a limited right, enjoyed by two groups of faculty members: (1) professors whose views align with the majority on political or pedagogical issues, and therefore needn't worry about being attacked for their "poisonous" perspectives; or (2) tenure-track and tenured professors who are certain that they will never want to work someplace else at any point during their career.

In Nelson's academy, any professor, anywhere in the country, who might want to move onto another institution---and therefore would be subject to a "hiring decision" at a future date in his or her career---needs to be careful about what he or she says, because any remarks, on any issue, could be used to deny them a new position. Volokh Conspiracy's David Bernstein appropriately eviscerated this argument.

Nelson's statement about "poisonous" views as grounds for non-hiring also seemed to contradict the AAUP's caution against using "collegiality" in the personnel process, since "a distinct criterion of collegiality also holds the potential of chilling faculty debate and discussion." Nelson's remark didn't make clear what differentiated an "uncollegial" from a "poisonous" viewpoint, but the principle remains the same---surely a distinct criterion of refusing to hire someone on the grounds of allegedly "poisonous" views would hold the potential of chilling faculty debate and discussion.

Nelson's assault on academic freedom continued last month, when the New York Times discussed demands from some Berkeley "activists" that the University of California's Law School fire John Yoo, because of the dubious (at best) arguments presented by Yoo as a member of the Bush administration. (Yoo had received tenure at Berkeley before Bush was elected, and was on leave during his time on Washington.)

The law school's dean, Christopher Edley (himself hardly a conservative) understood the threat to academic freedom posed by the protests against Yoo. In a thoughtful e-mail sent to the campus, Edley noted, "Assuming one believes as I do that Professor Yoo offered bad ideas and even worse advice during his government service, that judgment alone would not warrant dismissal or even a potentially chilling inquiry." Even Brian Leiter, normally a vociferous defender of the majority viewpoint in the academy, conceded, "If 'research misconduct' or 'intellectual dishonesty' were interpreted to cover what he has done then there would be nothing left of academic freedom, since every disagreement on the merits of a position, especially a minority position in the scholarly community, could be turned into a 'research misconduct' charge that would lead to disciplinary proceedings and possible termination."

The issue, however, was far from settled to Nelson. Indeed, the AAUP head appeared to demand the very inquiry that Dean Edley warned would be "potentially chilling." Upon seeing protesters calling for Yoo's dismissal, Nelson said that he introduced himself "as president of the American Association of University Professors and explained to them that Mr. Yoo had to receive due process, that the dean could not act unilaterally. They were happy to adjust their demands and argue instead that appropriate hearings commence immediately." Incredibly, Nelson positioned his behavior as a defense of academic freedom.

Even more troublingly, Nelson used his anti-Yoo remarks to engage in a broader assault on the concept of academic freedom. The president of the AAUP asserted that "moral and political" considerations "are clearly fair when deciding whether or not to hire a faculty member in the first place. You have a right not to hire someone whose views you consider reprehensible."


Johnson goes on to historicize Nelson's remark, noting that back in the day, Cold War-era faculty would, by Nelson's standards, have been justified in refusing to hire left-wing academics ... like Nelson. His point is that what goes around comes around--and that any approach to academic freedom that seeks to make "poisonous" views a criterion in hiring is not an approach to academic freedom that is going to preserve the principle, the practice, or the profession for long.

I can't read Johnson's mind. But I am guessing he finds Li-Ann's viewpoint morally repugnant (I do). He clearly also finds Yoo's analysis of what constitutes torture morally and analytically questionable. But his point is that real academic freedom simply must be viewpoint neutral. If it's not, it's not a protection, but a cudgel that can be used against whoever happens not to embrace the proper politics of the moment.

If you care about the integrity of the academy--and about the future of tenure--you can't go around making hiring decisions on the basis of a job candidate's politics. You also can't go around investigating scholars for publishing their views--even if those views are repugnant to the majority. This is not news. The AAUP has been making these points for many years.

Decisions about discipline have to be based on behavior, not opinion. Decisions about hiring have to be made on the basis of the scholarship, the teaching, the qualifications. And while political stance and scholarly outlook are often closely connected--despite the claims of academics who argue that the strong leftward tilt of the academy is meaningless, and tells us nothing about the kinds of scholarship and teaching that do and do not go on--they are not the same. It's a difficult distinction to make in the era of politicized scholarship, but it's a vital one. Nelson should be leading the way in drawing this distinction--and modeling how to apply this distinction to tough situations like the cases mentioned above. Instead, he's driven another nail in the coffin of the public's growing mistrust of academia's ability to police itself. (Another metaphor; apologies.)

As a junior faculty member, I once sat on the department's executive committee. That meant that I was part of discussions about hiring, and that I had a vote in those decisions. Once, when the committee was struggling to decide who should be offered a particular tenure-track job, another member of the committee offered up a killer point. "Do we really want another white South African on our faculty?" she asked. That settled things--because, of course, who would want that? People might think you were pro-apartheid or something. And a department's political cred is far more important than its integrity.

The question made it possible to cross one job finalist off the list, and so helped narrow the considerations. I don't remember who got that job, or even what the job was for. But I remember that question vividly--and also recall that not one person in the room spoke up to challenge the logic involved. I was too unformed and too green to be in a position to do that myself. It felt wrong to me, but I could not then have said why. Instead, I followed the lead of my betters. But I've always remembered that moment. Nelson's attempts to rationalize analogous kinds of choices bring it back vividly.

posted on September 2, 2009 8:11 AM




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Comments:

So do you think academic freedom should also protect a professor who advocates that slavery should be legalized in the U.S. again, or that interracial or inter-religious marriage should be illegal?

With academic freedom comes responsibility. A faculty member must be able to present their viewpoints in a manner that does cross the line into harassment targeted at a protected group. NYU (and New York City law) recognizes sexual orientation as a protected group. Thio Li-ann does not, and vociferously harassed students, staff, and the LGBT community at large. Moreover, I doubt even Liberty University would have hired her had they actually seen the bankrupt logic of her speech and book.

Blogging about topics as complex as Thio without actually doing the research is quite disastrous.

Posted by: bob at September 2, 2009 1:46 PM



Bob,

If you think expressing repellant viewpoints per se can be construed as harassment of protected groups, then you are the one who needs to do the research. You might start with the extensive explanations of the flaws in that argument elaborated at www.thefire.org.

Posted by: Erin O'Connor at September 2, 2009 1:50 PM



Perhaps there should be no protected groups.

Posted by: John Drake at September 2, 2009 2:14 PM



John Drake wrote:

Perhaps there should be no protected groups.

Nah . . . all animals are equal, except some are more equal than others.

Or so I heard.

Posted by: Minerva at September 2, 2009 8:06 PM



Sorry. I wouldn't hire anyone, for any position, who was a young earth creationist. Or a Holocaust denier.

We wouldn't hire someone who was dumb for a job that required smarts, right? And unless you're some kind of relativist, you should have the courage of your convictions that your intellectual positions are truthful. And while on some issues you might think that different interpretations or viewpoints are valid, you should ultimately believe that there *is* a truth to be discovered, eventually. And so if you want a smart person for a job, and the person you are interviewing holds positions you believe are false or dumb, you should not wish to hire them. Unless you think there is no truth, or unless you think truth is something each person has personally.

Posted by: Luther Blissett at September 2, 2009 10:17 PM



Matt, You are confusing untenable intellectual positions (which can be assessed with reference to fact) with controversial political ones (which are opinions). No one is saying Holocaust deniers should get equal play at the hiring stage--or the classroom, or the promotion process, for that matter--if the "scholarship" is all about Holocaust denial. However, if you are an engineering professor and your academic work is all about physics--you have freedom of extramural utterance, as argued by the AAUP, as part of your academic freedom. See the case of Northwestern engineering professor Arthur Butz. See also the ACTA blog, 2006, for the case of Kevin Barrett, a 9/11 conspiracy theorist who was prevented from attempting to indoctrinate his students with his crackpot ideas--but was still allowed into the classroom to teach his subject.

Posted by: Erin O'Connor at September 3, 2009 7:20 AM



LB...those who hire and manage people should always be concerned about avoiding the abuse of authority. If you're hiring welders for a factory, it's a legitimate exercise of authority to ask how good they are at welding. It's abuse of authority to ask about their political and religious opinions. I don't see any reason why the principles should be any different in academia.

I once had a small group of computer programmers working somewhere in my organization who, I was surprised to discover, were devout Christians. (Surprised because this isn't particularly common among programmers) I didn't inquire as to the details of their religious beliefs, but it's possible that some of them might have been young-earth creationists. Should I have denied myself the benefits of their design and programming skills (and they were very good) because of their religious and metaphysical beliefs? Would it have been ethical to do so? Would it have been *legal* to do so?

Posted by: david foster at September 3, 2009 7:41 AM



I'd hire Thio Li-ann at my school in a heartbeat. I'd also have lots of fun satirizing some of her ideas in the school paper. It wouldn't be hard to whip up an argument that people who mistake the voices in their head for God are a lot like those awful gays: delusional, objectively disordered, and harmful to society. It would be especially fun to write, with the level of graphic detail that graces her infamous speech, about the nasty, disease-spreading acts that heterosexual women so often perform with their mouths and their anuses, and their mouths and men's penises, and their mouths and men's anuses....

Presumably Li-ann would agree with me that women have no right to engage in nonprocreative sex outside of marriage, which might not sit too well with a lot of the conservative guys on campus, but when those voices inside your head start talking, what are you gonna do?

Li-ann would be free to respond, of course. The students would have a ball following the debate, and everyone would learn a lot about the depth and tenacity of our divisions--what's not to like?

Viewpoint discrimination is for wimps.

Posted by: Eveningsun at September 3, 2009 9:14 AM



I don't exactly get Johnson's point. Surely academic freedom IS a "limited right" and surely it applies differently in hiring vs. termination/ retaliation situations. Putting aside political views, it is clear that hiring departments have a right to evaluate whether a candidate's academic or pedagogical views are out of the mainstream in a given discipline. Although we would all probably agree that search committees should focus on quality rather than conformity, not liking someone's scholarship or approach to teaching is surely a legitimate reason not to hire them. Of course, conformity can be a bad thing for institutional life and the vitality of disciplines, so faculty who have "proven themselves" as teachers and scholars are granted tenure as a form of protection. This seems pretty basic to me.

The question, then, is whether political extramural remarks should be accorded *additional* protection in the hiring process (that is a protection that scholarship and teaching are *not* given). I'm agree with David that it's an abuse of authority to use political criteria to judge candidates for academic jobs (or jobs as welders), but I'm not sure that this is really a matter of academic freedom.

Posted by: Peter Shoemaker at September 3, 2009 10:51 AM



Were Thio Li-ann actually a candidate for a job where I work, I'm pretty sure I know what would happen when the search committee began discussing her application. Everyone would studiously avoid her extracurricular politics. Everyone would agree she's academically brilliant. The discussion would quickly settle on the severe underenrollment of the classes she was set to teach at NYU. The committee would wonder if she'd chronically suffer similar underenrollment here. In any ordinary case that might be a legitimate concern, but of course in this case, for at least some committee members, it would just be a proxy for their disapproval of her politics. Given that the underenrollment at NYU was caused by her politics, the committee would start to wonder whether its concern with it was legit. We'd kick the question to our HR director, who'd then tell us not to say another word until she got off the phone with the state attorney general's office. (We're as lawsuit-averse as anyone.) I'm not sure what advice we'd get from the AG. Be interesting to know.

Posted by: Eveningsun at September 3, 2009 12:52 PM



"...it is clear that hiring departments have a right to evaluate whether a candidate's academic or pedagogical views are out of the mainstream in a given discipline."

What constitutes "the mainstream"? Whose mainstream? The viewpoint of the majority of academics in a particular field? Even if the majority of actual practitioners in a field lie someplace very different along the spectrum?

As an attorney, I'm thinking of John Yoo: the legal academy finds anyone who would give particular kinds of legal advice to political figures they dislike as "outside the mainstream." But the legal academy is far less influential in the actual practice of law than they think they are, and out here in the real world, lawyers are supposed to present their clients with what the law actually is, not what academia would normatively like it to be, what the potential legal consequences of different actions might be, and what the legal arguments could be in turn to respond to those consequences. To fail to present such candid and thorough research would itself be a violation of an attorney's professional ethical duty of competent representation, and to fail to make every good-faith argument one could were there consequences would violate an attorney's duty to be a zealous advocate for their client.

What so much of the legal academy says was "out of the mainstream" about John Yoo amounts to saying he should have either resigned from his job at DOJ, or behaved in an unethical manner that would itself have justified professional discipline by the bar.

Posted by: Dave J at September 4, 2009 5:12 PM



Often, of course, what is considered "mainstream" in academia is very out-of-the-mainstream from the standpoint of the overall society. What precisely is the benefit to society in funding islands of conformity, within which the local belief patterns must be perpetuated without challenge?

Posted by: david foster at September 5, 2009 7:06 AM



Good grief. My point is simply that hiring departments constantly make the following kinds of judgments:
- Is Candidate X's research topic regarded as important within the discipline?
- Are Candidate X's research methods consistent with accepted practices in the discipline?
- Etc.
I'm not sure how replacing such criteria with the "mainstream" values of the "overall society" would benefit academic freedom.

Posted by: Peter Shoemaker at September 6, 2009 4:51 PM



Here's a blurb from Wikipedia about Lynn Margulis.

"Lynn Margulis attended the University of Chicago as an undergraduate, and received her Ph.D. in 1963 from UC Berkeley. In 1966, as a young faculty member at Boston University, she wrote a theoretical paper entitled The Origin of Mitosing Eukaryotic Cells.[2] The paper however was "rejected by about fifteen scientific journals," Margulis recalled.[3] It was finally accepted by The Journal of Theoretical Biology and is considered today a landmark in modern endosymbiotic theory.... The paper was initially heavily rejected, as symbiosis theories had been dismissed by mainstream biology at the time. Weathering constant criticism of her ideas for decades, Margulis is famous for her tenacity in pushing her theory forward, despite the opposition she faced at the time."

Doesn't the advancement of science require that ideas outside the mainstream be considered?

Posted by: Laura(southernxyl) at September 6, 2009 6:35 PM



I'm not saying that ideas outside of the mainstream shouldn't be considered. I'm just saying that it is legitimate for departments, when considering the interests of the institution, the discipline, and the students, to consider disciplinary norms. Again, I'm not sure that I see what the alternative is.

Posted by: Peter Shoemaker at September 7, 2009 5:59 AM



PeterS...not really what I'm saying. My point is, if conformity is to be inculcated, why should it be conformity to the values current in academia rather than conformity to the values current in the larger society? My preference would be that conformity not be inculcated at all.

As Laura points out, the advancement of science often happens when topics that were previously outside the mainstream of the field are addressed and/or topics are addressed using previously-unused methods.

Posted by: david foster at September 7, 2009 6:12 AM



David,

I agree that conformity should not be the goal and that advances often come from people thinking outside of the box. Indeed there could be an argument that hiring/promoting institutions should seek out candidates who are *out* of the disciplinary mainstream. My point is simply that disciplinary standards are always relevant to such decisions—whether one chooses to embrace them or repudiate them. Such standards define the landscape of scholarship and it is hard to imagine a hiring or promotion process that would be totally indifferent to them.

Posted by: Peter Shoemaker at September 8, 2009 4:06 PM



PeterS..."Such standards define the landscape of scholarship and it is hard to imagine a hiring or promotion process that would be totally indifferent to them."

Probably true. In business, outside-the-mainstream innovation generally happens in one of two ways:

--a small group of individuals invest their own money & time, attract risk capital, and start a new business
--someone within an existing company is persuasive and charismatic enough to get his own internal venture established, with obvious positive or negative consequences for his career depending on the success or failure of the venture

It's not clear what the academic equivalents of these paths might be, especially outside of the hard sciences...in the sciences, at least, sufficiently convincing hard evidence may convince those in the mainstream to alter their opinions..but in fields that are less objective, the mainstream will probably flow on however it likes.

Posted by: david foster at September 9, 2009 6:42 AM